Clause Input Bindings: Sensor, Credential, Simulation

Securing Inputs for Verifiable Execution with Structured, Auditable Data Flows

3.7.1 Why Input Binding Matters in Verifiable Governance

A Smart Clause is only as trustworthy as the data it operates on.

In conventional governance:

• Inputs are often opaque or unverifiable

• Source attribution is undocumented

• Sensor values can be spoofed

• Credential state is not synchronized with logic

• Simulation models are decoupled from enforcement

In NSF, Clause Input Binding creates explicit, traceable, and secure data interfaces that:

• Ensure clause logic is bound to verifiable, source-certified data

• Authenticate input origin and structure

• Enable ZK-compatible or TEE-verified computation

• Establish input-output lineage in the Audit Layer

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3.7.2 Three Primary Input Types in NSF Clauses

Input Type	Description
Sensor Input	Real-time or cached values from trusted physical, geospatial, or remote sensing devices
Credential Input	Agent credentials, verifiable proofs, and roles
Simulation Input	Forecast outputs, risk indices, or modeled thresholds

Each input class is explicitly declared in SCL and linked to a data validation and origin verification process.

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3.7.3 Input Declaration in SCL

Example:

inputBindings:
  - type: sensor
    source: EO::NASA::[email protected]
    field: soilMoisture
    constraint: value < 0.15
  - type: credential
    schema: WaterQualityInspectorVC
    constraint: valid && notRevoked
  - type: simulation
    model: [email protected]
    field: floodIndex
    constraint: floodIndex > 0.85

Each binding is:

• Typed

• Constrained by logic

• Cryptographically verifiable at execution time

• Included in the CAC output

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3.7.4 Sensor Input Bindings

Sensor bindings can originate from:

• Earth Observation (e.g., NASA, Copernicus, Sentinel)

• IoT Devices (e.g., river gauges, temperature monitors, air quality sensors)

• Field Reports via mobile attestations

• Trusted data aggregators with signed hashes

All sensor input must:

• Be signed or attested via a SensorCredentialVC

• Include metadata: timestamp, device ID, jurisdiction, source DAO

• Conform to a predefined data schema (JSON Schema, GeoJSON, etc.)

• Be auditable and retrievable from the Audit Layer or IPFS/Filecoin archives

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3.7.5 Credential Input Bindings

Credential inputs bind execution to:

• Agent identity and role

• Prior verifiable conditions

• Institutional authorization

• Jurisdictional mapping

Example:

require:
  hasCredential(agent, "FoodSafetyInspectorVC")
  && credential.status == "valid"
  && credential.issuedIn == "Kenya"

The credential itself:

• Must conform to W3C Verifiable Credential spec

• Be anchored to a recognized schema in the Registry Layer

• Pass revocation and timestamp checks

• Be recorded in the execution trace (CAC)

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3.7.6 Simulation Input Bindings

Simulation inputs reference:

• Forecast models

• Risk exposure indices

• Emission projections

• Scenario outputs

They may be:

• Statically attached during clause governance

• Dynamically fetched from simulation engines (e.g., ClimateSimRunner)

• ZK-verified (optional for sensitive models)

• Linked to the clause via SimulationBundle ID

Example:

bindSimulation("[email protected]")
field: riskScore
constraint: riskScore > 0.7

Sim bindings are hashed and stored in the Audit Layer with:

• Model ID

• Run ID

• Timestamp

• Reviewer signatures (if applicable)

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3.7.7 Hybrid Inputs and Binding Combinations

Clauses may use composite bindings, such as:

if sensor.soilMoisture < 0.12
  && simulation.riskIndex > 0.8
  && credential.role == "Inspector"
then issue("DroughtReliefVC")

This guarantees:

• Multi-source agreement

• Multimodal threshold enforcement

• Multi-jurisdictional execution constraints

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3.7.8 Binding Verification at Execution

All inputs are validated in:

• TEE-backed enclaves

• ZK circuits (if required)

• Credential resolution APIs

• Sensor registries with attestation logs

Execution fails if:

• Input schema mismatch

• Signature invalid

• Credential revoked

• Timestamp expired

• Simulation not reproducible

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3.7.9 CAC Output and Input Provenance

The Clause-Attested Compute (CAC) output includes:

• Input hashes

• Sensor source credential

• Credential holder DID and VC metadata

• Simulation package ID and run parameters

• Timestamp and jurisdictional scope

• Audit trace anchor

This enables post-hoc execution verification and forensic replay.

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3.7.10 Input Bindings as the Roots of Clause Integrity

Without input binding, clause logic is untrustworthy.

With it, every clause execution is:

• Anchored to real, verifiable data

• Bound to roles, jurisdictions, and evidence

• Traceable through audit and registry links

• Enforceable across agents, contracts, and systems

• Transparent for review, override, or escalation

Input bindings make every clause execution a truth-enforced act.

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