Replay Resistance and Anti-Slashing Mechanisms

Ensuring Execution Finality, Preventing Malicious Reuse, and Protecting Governance Agents in Zero-Trust Environments

4.9.1 The Threat of Replay in Verifiable Governance

In a distributed, cryptographically signed system, replay attacks pose a serious risk:

• Reusing a valid Clause-Attested Compute (CAC) to trigger unintended re-executions

• Circumventing time-based or context-specific constraints

• Spoofing credential issuance, revocation, or financial actions

• Reusing stale simulation inputs in adversarial forks

NSF addresses this via a layered approach combining:

• Replay-resistant clause design

• One-time use CAC identifiers

• Signed runtime state commitments

• Anti-slashing logic to penalize double-execution attempts

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4.9.2 CAC-Level Replay Resistance Guarantees

Each CAC includes the following replay prevention fields:

{
  "execution_id": "cac-0x8473ab1...",
  "nonce": "0x001a... (unique)",
  "input_commitment": "0xabc123...",
  "runtime_scope": {
    "timestamp": "2025-04-30T18:47:00Z",
    "validity_window": "120s",
    "clause_epoch": "4.2.1"
  }
}

Each execution is:

• Nonce-locked: Cannot reuse same execution_id

• Timestamped and scoped

• Cryptographically linked to input hash, credential states, and DAO authority

Any reuse attempt will fail validation at Audit Layer and DAO verifiers.

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4.9.3 Input Commitment Binding

The clause runtime calculates:

input_commitment = H(inputs || credential_roots || simulation_run_id)

This binds the clause logic to a unique context. Any variation in:

• Sensor values

• Simulation outputs

• Credential revocation state

… results in a new, non-replayable CAC hash.

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4.9.4 Governance-Locked Execution Contexts

Clauses may define a governance_scope, such as:

{
  "dao": "WaterDAO",
  "jurisdiction": "ETH",
  "epoch": "Q2-2025",
  "authorized_roles": ["DroughtReliefOperator", "DAOKeySigner"]
}

Execution is permitted only within this scope, and any attempt to:

• Replay in a different DAO

• Trigger in an invalid epoch

• Forge outputs in another jurisdiction

… is rejected and slashable.

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4.9.5 Enclave Nonce Sealing and Replay Detection

Each TEE node:

• Maintains a secure enclave counter

• Stores a recent nonce registry

• Seals execution state with clause ID + timestamp

On execution:

• Nonce is checked against enclave-local ledger

• If reuse is detected → fail execution, alert audit layer

• Rollup builders and verifiers reject double-CAC attempts automatically

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4.9.6 Anti-Slashing Rules for Validators and Nodes

NSF introduces anti-slashing mechanisms to:

• Deter malicious or negligent double-execution

• Penalize repeated signature attempts on divergent outputs

• Protect honest nodes from accidental replay

Slashable Conditions:

Condition	Slash Severity
Duplicate CAC ID	High
Conflicting outputs with same input hash	High
Unattested re-execution	Medium
Replay outside validity window	Medium
Credential reuse after revocation	Medium
Improper nonce handling	Low–Medium

All slashing events are:

• Recorded in the Audit Layer

• Publicly viewable

• DAO-triggered via governance rules

• Optionally ZK-verifiable to protect privacy

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4.9.7 Credential-Replay Protections

For credentials issued based on CACs:

• A credential is linked to a unique CAC

• Any attempt to re-issue from the same CAC → automatically fails VC registry validation

• Revocation triggers include hash verification and execution scope check

Credential integrity is enforced through:

• One-time-use CAC references

• Simulation ID + execution window constraints

• Jurisdictional VC issuance keys bound to clause scope

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4.9.8 Replay Auditing and Cross-Jurisdiction Tracing

NSF auditors and DAO agents can:

• Run replay detection queries

• Check for CAC hash duplication across rollups

• Verify simulation model outputs linked to multiple CACs

• Flag runtime configuration mismatches for the same input

Example:

audit_query: find all CACs using soilMoisture < 0.1 in jurisdiction = "SDN"  
between 2025-04-01 and 2025-04-10, grouped by clause_id

Any anomalies are flagged for arbitration or fork-induced policy override.

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4.9.9 Resilience Against Rollup Replay and ZK Circuit Abuse

Rollup validators must:

• Verify CAC uniqueness within and across batches

• Enforce clause execution epoch per governance policy

• Ensure ZK proofs reference distinct simulation runs or timestamp ranges

• Detect duplicate Merkle leaves with same outputs

Misbehavior results in:

• Rollup invalidation

• Node slashing

• DAO reputation penalties

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4.9.10 Replay Resistance as the Foundation of Governance Finality

In NSF:

• No action is valid unless it’s executed once

• No policy is enforced unless it’s bound to its context

• No credential is trusted unless it’s linked to an unrepeatable proof

• No output is accepted unless it’s distinct, signed, and scoped

Replay resistance turns ephemeral computation into governance finality. Anti-slashing enforces it—without centralized enforcement, but with cryptographic certainty.