Proof-of-Execution

Guaranteeing Trust in Clause Execution Through Cryptographic Attestation and Secure Compute Encapsulation

4.3.1 The Role of Proof-of-Execution (PoE) in NSF

In NSF, every Smart Clause must not only execute correctly—but prove it did.

Proof-of-Execution (PoE) is the mechanism by which a system attests that:

• The clause executed deterministically

• It was isolated from unauthorized interference

• The environment met governance and jurisdictional constraints

• Inputs and outputs were faithfully processed

• The runtime could be externally verified

PoE enables cryptographic trust in governance-critical workloads, including:

• Disaster-triggered payouts

• Treaty enforcement clauses

• Threshold-based emissions penalties

• Credential-triggered actions (e.g., quarantine, relocation, finance release)

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4.3.2 NSF-Defined Properties of a Valid Execution Proof

An NSF-compliant execution proof must demonstrate:

Property	Description
Bounded	Executed within a clearly defined runtime environment
Sealed	Internal state cannot be accessed externally during execution
Signed	Output is cryptographically signed by a trusted enclave or prover
Verifiable	Proof can be validated independently by any party using public keys or audit registries
Replayable	Inputs can be re-executed under same conditions to yield identical results
Scoped	Jurisdiction, DAO, and clause version are part of the runtime state
Composable	Can be used as part of multi-clause execution or decision graph

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4.3.3 Execution Backends Supporting PoE

NSF supports the following execution models for PoE:

Model	Description
TEE (SGX, SEV, Enarx)	Runtime provides hardware-enforced isolation, signed attestation, remote verification
ZK Execution (SNARK/STARK)	Clause logic compiled to circuit; prover outputs zero-knowledge proof of correct execution
Confidential Copilot (WASM sandboxed)	User-local isolated runtime with deterministic execution and DID-linked signature
Multi-sig Verifier Ensemble	Multiple enclave signers validate execution by running clause independently and co-signing

Each backend produces a CAC with embedded PoE, including attestation metadata, prover identity, and runtime configuration.

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4.3.4 Enclave-Based Runtime Isolation

In TEE-based execution:

• Clause logic and inputs are loaded into an enclave with secure memory

• No other process or OS layer can access runtime state

• Enclave generates an attestation quote containing:

  • Measurement hash (i.e., code fingerprint)

  • Public key of the enclave

  • Runtime parameters (jurisdiction, clause ID, trigger type)

• This quote is signed by the chip manufacturer’s key or validator root

• Output is sealed and passed outside the enclave as part of the CAC

This ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the clause during execution.

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4.3.5 ZK Proof-of-Execution

For sensitive or privacy-critical clauses, NSF enables ZK-based execution where:

• Clause logic is transpiled to a SNARK/STARK circuit

• Inputs are committed via hash

• Prover runs clause logic within a circuit-compliant environment

• Outputs and proof are generated together

• Verifier uses public key to confirm:

  • The clause logic matched the registered hash

  • The inputs were committed

  • The outputs follow clause logic exactly

No secrets are revealed—yet the execution is provably correct.

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4.3.6 Runtime Metadata in CAC

Each CAC includes a runtime_info section with:

"runtime_info": {
  "type": "TEE",
  "vendor": "Intel SGX",
  "build_hash": "0xabc123...",
  "enclave_id": "0xdeadbeef...",
  "prover_did": "did:nsf:TEEExecutor#node5",
  "attestation_signature": "0xCAFEBABE...",
  "verified_by": "NSFValidatorSet@2025-Q2"
}

This metadata allows downstream systems (e.g., DAOs, audit nodes, treaty monitors) to:

• Verify execution origin

• Trace version compliance

• Perform runtime audits

• Validate trust domain membership

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4.3.7 Isolation from Host and External Interference

NSF mandates:

• No direct host access to enclave memory

• All I/O is signed and audit-traced

• Time, randomness, and syscall access are sealed or sandboxed

• All cryptographic keys used inside enclave are hardware-bound

• Side-channel protections via microcode isolation (where applicable)

Execution must be reproducible, sandboxed, and cryptographically sealed.

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4.3.8 Execution Proof Anchor Points

PoEs are:

• Recorded in the Audit Layer (with timestamp and anchor ID)

• Optionally written to:

  • Public chains (Ethereum, Filecoin, Arweave)

  • Treaty-specific append-only logs

  • Domain-specific registries (e.g., ICAO, WHO, FATF monitors)

• Verifiable by:

  • Public auditors

  • DAO governance agents

  • Credential issuers

  • Cross-jurisdictional oracles

This turns clause execution into publicly verifiable, tamper-evident records.

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4.3.9 Multi-Party Verification

Some clauses may require:

• Threshold signature validation (e.g., 3 out of 5 enclave validators must sign output)

• Delegated verifier attestation

• Layered PoE validation across sovereign nodes

NSF defines a composable PoE model that supports:

• Multi-TEE execution agreement

• ZK + TEE hybrid proofs

• Jurisdictionally constrained validation sets

• Fork-specific verifier scopes

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4.3.10 Proof-of-Execution as Institutional Memory

PoE transforms NSF clause execution from ephemeral code to verifiable institutional action.

It enables:

• Post-event dispute resolution

• Treaty compliance enforcement

• Regulatory traceability

• Simulation validation

• Governance audits at scale

With PoE, governance no longer requires trust in opaque systems. It becomes a sequence of verifiable, cryptographic proofs—a new language of action across machines, humans, and nations.